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INTRODUCTION 
Today, American labor is recognized as a part of the greatest 
productive machine the world has ever known. The present status of 
labor, however, developed only within the past thirty years. In this 
general survey of labor in hte 1930's the many barriers and obstacles 
experienced in the growth of organized labor will be discussed. 
In the history of the United States periods of great change have 
emerged. New conditions and attitudes take root and break long 
established precedents. The political, economic and social insta-
bility of the 1930's made it possible for labor to assume a new status. 
Labor's new position in the 1930's was due mainly to government 
legislation condoning and protecting union activities. The New Deal' s 
program for recovery from the depression was sympathetic to labor's 
problems. Since the Democratic Party sponsored the New Deal many 
laborers and labor leaders identified themselves with this political 
party. During the depression decade a cordial relationship existed 
between labor and the Democratic Party. This can be seen by 
reviewing campaign funds, elections, and campaign speeches of the 
decade. To understand labor's progress in the 1930's, a review of 
the history of labor in the 19 2 0' s is necessary. 
LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE 1930's 
An appropriate epigraph for labor in the 1920's is: Its goals 
and principles were drowned in a sea of prosperity and irresponsi-
bility. The prosperity of the 1920's, the aloofness of the American 
Federation of Labor, the red scare, and the anti-union strength of 
the employers made labor' s gains during the period insignificant. 
Unemployment was not a serious problem until 1929. 
During the prosperous twenties working conditions and long 
hours were the notable complaints. Unfair labor practices by 
employers were most evident among the unorganized industrial 
workers, such as steel and textile workers. The skilled workers 
represented by the A. F. L. fared well, caring little for their counter-
part in the mass production industries. Prosperity overwhelmed 
labor during this period. Unions became less aggressive and re-
luctant to organize. Union membership dropped from over five 
million in 19 2 0 to a little over three million in 19 2 9 . 1 Relations 
between industry and labor were definitely becoming more cordial. 
This can be illustrated by the following list of strikes and lockouts 
lArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , The Crisis of the Old Order 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 19 5 7), pp. 111-112. 
3 
during the 19 2 0 's as compiled by the U . S. Department of Labor: 
1920 - 3,291 
1921 - 2 ,381 
1922 - 2,381 
1923 - 1,553 
1924 - 1,240 
1925 - 1,300 
1926 - 1,032 
1927 - 734 
1928 - 6292 
Labor was involved in some political activity during the 
1920's. Its most interesting affiliation was with La Follette's 
Progressive Party during the election of 1924. Gompers and the 
A.F.L. endorsed the Progressive Party. The endorsement of 
La Follette is unusual since it was a tenet of Gompers not to 
become dependent on any one party. 3 La Follette's Party received 
support from the Railroad Brotherhoods. Support came from the 
Brotherhoods due to a plank in La Follette 1 s platform advocating 
the abolition of the injunction and government ownership of the 
railroads. 4 The radical labor element, consisting primarily of 
foreigners , also endorsed La Follette. 5 Even though labor did 
endorse the La Follette-Wheeler ticket most laborers did not 
give active support to the ticket. Local issues and alliances 
2cal Lewis, "Labor Bewitched," The North American Review, 
CCXLII (Autumn, 1936), p. 25. 
3william English Walling, 11 Labor's Attitude Toward A Third 
Party, 11 Current History, XXI (October, 1924), p. 40. 
4Edward G. Lowry, 11 La Follette' s Own Platform," World's 
Work, XLVIII (September, 1924), p. 515. 
5stephen Frost, "La Follette's Mixed Army," Outlook, 
CXXXVIII (October 29, 1924L p. 322. 
4 
were more important to the rank and file and local leaders • Other 
factors which indicate lack of labor unity was John L. Lewis' 
support of President Coolidge / and George Berry's (head of the 
Printing Pressman) support of the Democratic nominee, John W. Davis. 
Labor's failure to deliver the vote was a factor in La Follette's defeat. 
During the period of the 19 2 0 's A. F . L. membership declined 
from 4,078,068 in 1920 to 2,865,978 in 1924. The United Mine 
Workers had the greatest decline in membership in the early 1920's. 
Coal was an ailing industry, failing to share in the country's 
prosperity, because of competition from new sources of power. 
Consequently, mine owners cut production costs by depriving 
miners of a fair wage. Though the U. M. W. had the greatest loss 
of membership, it still remained the largest union in the A. F. L. 
Extensive use of the black-list and yellow-dog contract also 
caused union membership to drop. 6 The only notable legislation 
in labor's favor during the 1920's was the Railway Labor Act of 
1926. This Act recognized the bargaining rights of the several 
brotherhoods. It also forbade discrimination against unionists. 
The Act set up a Board of Mediation to handle disputes and to act 
as arbitrator. 7 
6 11 Where Election Leaves Labor," Literary Digest, LXXXIII 
(November 29, 1924)1- pp. 9-10. 
?Herbert Harris, American Labor (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 193 8), p. 2 62. 
5 
With the start of the depression labor along with the rest of 
mankind lingered in misery. Markets dwindled, prosperity fled, 
and there were legions of unemployed. During the days of 
depression a change of attitude is seen in A.F.L. President, 
William Green. Prior to the depression, Green received most of 
his support in the A.F.L. from the United Mine Workers of which 
he was a member. During the depression the U .M.W. lost many 
of their members and much of their prominence in the A.F .L. 
Consequently, Green began to court the favor of the craft unions. 8 
The absence of an unemployment compensation plan added to 
labor' s misery during the depression. President Hoover's principal 
weapon against the depression was the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation. The R. F. C. did not help labor directly because its 
main function was to aid business and stabilize banking. 9 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed some very 
interesting information on unemployment plans operating in the 
country during the early 1930 1s. In 1931 there were seventy-
nine unemployment benefit plans operating that affected 
226,000 workers. There were fifteen company plans, sixteen 
joint agreement plans between trade unions and employers, and 
8Edward Levinson, Labor On The March (New York: 
University Books, 1937), p. 7. 
9schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, p. 23 6. 
6 
forty-eight trade union plans maintained solely by labor 
organizations. In 1931 there were no compulsory insurance 
plans in the United States. There were approximately thirty-
five million wage earners in America in 1931. The scarcity of 
unemployment compensation plans is evident when the thirty-five 
million wage earners are compared to the 2 2 6 , 0 0 0 covered by 
unemployment plans . 10 
Although the workers suffered, the A. F. L. 's attitude 
towards unemployment insurance was negative. William Green, 
at the 1931 A.F .L. Convention, denounced anything resembling 
the dole. Green feared unions would lose some of their rights • 
Green's fear was true to the Gompers' tradition of voluntarism .11 
During the 1932 A.F .L. Convention at Cincinnati John L. Lewis 
endorsed unemployment insurance. As might be expected the old 
guard of the A. F. L. opposed the proposal. The old guard 
believed any such plan would make the union too dependent on 
government . 12 
Prior to the New Deal, labor's greatest advance in the 
1930's was the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. This Act outlawed 
lOuunemployment Benefit Plans Now Operating in the United 
States," Congressional Digest, X (August, 1931), p. 200 
1111 0rganized Labor Spurns the Dole," Literary Digest, 
CXI (October 31, 1931), p. 10. 
12 
Levinson, Labor On The March, p. 49 • 
7 
the yellow-dog contract and restricted the use of federal anti-labor 
injunctions. The use of injunctions had been outrageous. Here is 
an example of how unreasonable the use of injunctions were: 
An injunction issued in Iowa in 1930 en-
joined the defendants from communicating verbally 
or in written form or in any other manner, that there 
was a strike at a certain mill or that there was a 
controversy over wages, or that the complainant 
was unfair to organized union labor. The injunc-
tion prohibited an employee from mentioning even 
to his wife any of the said examples. If the em-
ployee spoke publicly of employer injustices, he 
could be put in contempt of court .13 
The 1932 Presidential campaign found Hoover defending his 
business oriented programs and solemnly stating the country was 
on the path to recovery. Roosevelt in his speeches emphasized 
the need for direct relief and advocated unemployment insurance, 
and he referred to the "forgotten man" many times. However, 
there was nothing in Roosevelt's immediate program for labor 
except a promise to put people to work. The A. F. L. was neutral 
during the campaign except for the endorsement of friends of 
labor among the Congressional candidates. In summing up the 
election of 1932, the only valid conclusion that can be made is 
undoubtedly many laborers, disenchanted with the Hoover adminis-
tration, voted for Roosevelt. 
1311 Labor's Anti-Injunction Victory," Literary Digest, 
CXII (March 2 6 , 19 3 2), p . 13 . 
8 
After Roosevelt's inauguration the Black-Connery Bill was 
labor's hope among the tons of legislation then being considered 
by Congress. The bill's objective was to spread work by 
establishing a thirty-hour week. Roosevelt opposed the bill, 
because he was searching for a broadly based program which 
would also include some provisions for business recovery. The 
comprehensive plan that Roosevelt sought would eventually be 
the National Industrial Recovery Act .14 
The passage of the N.I.R.A. in June, 1933t gave labor 
a definite boost. Certain sections of this Act gave labor 
organizing rights , collect! ve bargaining rights, fixed minimum 
wages / and maximum hours .15 
Section 7a gave labor new life. Its main provisions read 
as follows: 
"Sec. 7 (a). Every code of fair competition, 
agreement, and license approved, prescribed 1 or 
issued under this title shall contain the following 
conditions: (1) That employees shall have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and shall 
be free from the interference, restraint, or 
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, 
in the designation of such representatives or in 
self-organization or in other concerted activities 
14Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor In America (New York: 
Thomas F. Crowell Company, 1960), pp. 263-266. 
15Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Corning of the New 
Deal {Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 99. 
9 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection; (2) that no employee 
shall and no one seeking employment shall be 
required as a condition of employment to join 
any company union or to refrain from joining, 
organizing, or as sis ting a labor organization of 
his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall 
comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum 
rates of pay / and other conditions of employment, 
approved or prescribed by the President." 16 
For the first time in the history of the nation a statute 
passed by the Congress of the United States contained a 
section according workers a legal right to organize and to be 
protected in the exercise of that right. 
Labor's reaction to the provisions of the NRA was most 
favorable. From Camden, New Jersey came the report that the 
NRA helped raise wage rates in the pulp and paper industry, 
furniture manufacturing, and automobile mechanics . Belleville , 
Illinois reported that NRA made it possible to organize the 
garment, shoe, and restaurant industries. From Cedar Rapids, 
Iowa came the report that the NRA had been instrumental in 
getting a wage hike and shorter hours for the workers. 17 
l 6william Green, 11 Labor' s Opportunity and Responsibility, 11 
American Federationist, XL (July, 1933), pp. 692-694. 
17 11 From Atlantic to Pacific," American Federationist, 
XL! (January, 1934), pp. 88-91. 
10 
Organization of labor and collective bargaining were 
provisions employers did not concur with. Consequently, a 
rash of strikes immediately broke out. The strikes developed 
because labor wanted to enforce the rights granted through 
Section 7a. There were strikes by the New York taxi 
drivers and the shipyard mechanics in New Jersey and a 
particularly violent longshoremen's strike in San Francisco 
led by Harry Bridges. These strikes and many others occurred 
because management did not obey Section 7a. In these strikes 
there was much bloodshed and violence . Organized labor 
encountered many obstacles during the existence of the N .I.R.A. 
Employers utilized everything available to break union movements. 
The use of tear gas, thugs / and espionage systems by employers 
was not uncommon. 
The U.S. Senate Education and Labor Committee (La Follette 
Civil Liberties Committee 1936-1940) disclosed industry's use of 
munitions such as tear gas, grenades, machine guns, revolvers, 
and shot guns. Two thirds of the tear gas used by industry was 
bought when unions were demanding recognition. Corporations 
Auxiliary Company was a detective agency that served big 
industries such as Chrysler, Firestone, Standard Oil, and thirteen 
General Motors plants. Spies were sent in by the detective 
11 
agencies to gain important positions within the unions . 18 Company 
unions were organized labor 1 s biggest barrier during this period. 
Of the six hundred fifty-three companies with union plans in 
November, 1933, sixty-one per cent were established after the 
N .I.R.A.19 
The main agency for interpreting provisions of Section 7a 
was the National Labor Board. This Board made decisions upholding 
majority rule in union elections. It also said employees should not 
be coerced by employers in choosing representation. However / 
this agency 1 s principles were not enforced. The National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers advised its members to disregard Section 7a 
until it had been established by proper judicial authority. 
Judicial delay / however, was destroying labor' s rights. The 
National Labor Board became extinct in the summer of 1934. It 
was replaced by the first National Labor Relations Board. 2 0 
l 8Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade (New York: 
Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1947) , pp. 280-2 83. 
1911 Union Movement Gains," Literary Digest, CXIX 
(May 18 1 1935),p. 3. 
2011Goodbye Section 7a, 11 New Republic, LXXX(October 31, 
1934, pp. 325-326. 
12 
General Hugh Johnson 1s and Donald Richberg 1s decisions 
on union -management codes were detrimental to labor. The 
most famous decision was the merit clause interpretation. The 
essence of it is as follows: employers could exercise their 
rights to choose, keep, or promote employees on the basis of 
merit without considering their membership in a union. Thus, 
the union movement was rendered helpless. 21 
Unfavorable interpretations, company unions, and 
vigilante committees were not the only barriers hampering 
organizing movements during this period. The arrogance and 
disinterest of the A. F. L. also hurt organizing movements. In 
March,. 19 3 4, the A. F. L. and the Automobile Chamber of 
Commerce came to an agreement on new unions. This agreement 
allowed for more than one bargaining agency in each plant. 
Division of workers into various unions made it quite easy for 
employers to promote their company plans at the expense of 
organizing movements. 2 2 
Although labor's status was declining as a result of 
National Recovery Act decisions, it still retained a spark of 
21 Levinson, Labor On The March, p. 5 8. 
22Levinson, Labor On The March, p. 62. 
13 
life. During a Labor Day speech at Chicago in 1934, Mayor 
Fiorella La Guardia of New York prophesied that when American 
labor got a stronger program nothing would stop its progress. 23 
During the campaign of 1934, the Democrats capitalized 
upon legislation it had given labor in the last two years. The 
party promised the "forgotten man" more programs, especially a 
social insurance plan. William Green and the A. F. L. gave 
support to such a program. Henry P. Fletcher, chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, accused the Democrats of using 
relief and drought funds for political purposes. 2 4 
In 1935 the N.R.A. was declared invalid. The Supreme 
Court declared that Congress had unconstitutionally given legis-
lative power to the President to draft the various codes. The 
Court also stated in the Schechter decision that firms engaged in 
intra-state commerce did not fall under the jurisdiction of the codes. 25 
In evaluating labor's fate during the days of N .R.A. several 
interesting conclusions come to light. Unemploy :rrent was reduced 
2311 Left vs. Right Battle-Lines Forming in Nation," Literary 
Digest, CXVIII (September 8, 1934), p. 6. 
24charles A. Beard, "The Politics of Our Depression," 
Current History, XLI (October, 1934), p. 6. 
25 rrank Freidel, America In the Twentieth Century, 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960}, p. 334. 
14 
by about two million during this period. Wages increased on the 
average of five and one-half per cent. The wage increases were 
offset, however, by increased living costs. Considering the 
many pros and cons of the Act, labor as a whole gained. 
Laborers who were unemployed were better off than those who were 
unemployed prior to the Act. Even though labor's gains were marginal 
in many instances, during the first two years of the New Deal, labor 
undoubtedly lost much of the dread and despair previously 
experienced . 2 6 
The 1935 A.F .L. Convention at Atlantic City revealed the 
organizing unrest that developed as a result of Section 7a. 
Several days after the convention began {October 9, 1935), John L. 
Lewis, Sidney Hillman, David Dubinsky, and Charles Howard led 
their unions and six others away from the Federation and formed the 
Committee for Industrial Organization. The primary cause for the 
split was the A. F. L. 's failure to provide militant and sound 
leadership to the mass production industries during the period when 
industrial workers begged to be organized. Tradition overwhelmed 
the A. F. L. in organizing procedure. The A. F. L. sought to organize 
the mass-production industries along craft lines. This was illogical 
since the mass-production worker was a composite mechanic and 
26' ·Mauritz A. Hallgren, "Labor and the New Deal, "Current 
History, XLII {September, 1935), pp. 563-567. 
15 
would do the work of various crafts. When the Federation failed 
to give unrestricted charters to new union groups its split became 
a fact. 27 
After the C. I. 0. seceded from the A. F. L"" labor in general 
became more closely related to politics and the Democratic Party. 
Since the N. I. R .A. and Guffey Act gave the C • I. 0 . leaders a 
taste of power because of increased membership 1 their interest in 
politics became more pronounced. In 1935 Roosevelt took a new 
and different view of labor. Many workers were irritated with the 
failure of the N .R.A. or national Run Around as it was now being 
dubbed. William Green stated the whole labor movement would 
oppose Roosevelt. Management was becoming more difficult to 
deal with. With all of these elements stacked against Roosevelt, 
he supported labor legislation in order to insure labor's loyalty 
in the coming election. Also he needed to curtail more militant 
and radical proposals beneficial to labor / such as the Townsend 
Plan and Huey Long's movement.28 
Friends of labor countered the militant groups with the 
Wagner Act, which became law on July 5 / 19 3 5 • The National 
Labor Relations Act was promoted by labor's Congressional 
271evinson,, Labor On The March, pp. 21, 109. 
2 8Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 
(New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 33 6-337. 
16 
friend, Senator Robert Wagner of New York. William Connery of 
Massachusetts managed the Bill in the House of Representatives. 
The Wagner Act was received with enthusiasm by William Green, 
who hailed it as labor' s Magna Carta. The introduction of the 
Wagner Act begins with a reference to management's irresponsi-
bili ty during the period of the N . I . R .A. : 
The denial by employers of employees' 
right to organize and the refusal by employers 
to accept the procedure of collective bargain-
ing, led to strikes or other forms of industrial 
strife or unrest, which have intent or the 
necessary effect, of burdening or obstructing 
commerce by impairing the efficiency, safety, 
or operation of the instruments of commerce. 29 
The Bill defined unfair labor practices on the part of employers, 
such as interference, restraint, coercion, domination, and 
discrimination in its relationship with employees. The Wagner 
Act also established the National Labor Relations Board as the 
official interpreter of union -management conflicts. The Board 
possessed the authority to eliminate on the part of the employer 
many unfair practices that had hampered union organization and 
collective bargaining rights. Power to settle jurisdictional dis-
putes between rival unions was also extended the N.L.R.B.30 
2 9Leo Wolman, "New National Labor Law," Review of 
Reviews, XCI (September, 1935}i pp. 31-32. 
3 OFlorence Peterson, American Labor Unions (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 262. 
17 
Employers were of the opinion that the Wagner Act would 
die the same death as the N .R.A. Even many laborers were 
apprehensive at this stage. In 193 7 the validity of the Act 
was upheld in the Supreme Court case, National Labor_Relations 
Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation. This decision 
marked a new trend in determining the scope of commerce power. 
The decision stated that whether or not the processes of manu-
facture were themselves interstate commerce, labor disturbances 
in the plant would re strain interstate commerce and were therefore 
subject to regulation. This interpretation paved the way for 
broader federal regulation. This interpretation had unprecedented 
powers that granted many favorable decisions to the new union 
movements . 31 
The Liberty League led the employers in their response to 
the Wagner Act. This group contended the company union was the 
true protector of the individual. Majority representation deprived the 
individual of these rights. A host of company lawyers prepared a 
brief declaring the N. L .R .A. invalid. This group would provide 
employers who ignored the N .L.R.B. with legal counsel. 32 
3 lcarl Brent Swisher, Historic Decisions of the Supreme 
Court (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958), 
pp. 150-151. 
3211A Conspiracy by Lawyers, 11 Nation, CXLI (October 2, 1935L 
p. 369. 
18 
During the second New Deal a pro labor attitude in legis-
lation is very evident. During the next few years many statutes 
that were favorable to labor passed through the galleries of 
Congress. In 1935 the Motor Carriers Act was passed. This Act 
gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the right to regulate 
maximum hours of service of employees responsible for safe 
operation of passenger and freight motor vehicles. 33 The Social 
Security Act passed in 1935 was another boost for labor. In 
essence this Act would provide workers with unemployment corn-
pensation. This Act went on to state the following: 
No one was to be denied payment of 
unemployment insurance for the following reasons: 
(a) Refusal to accept a job made 
vacant by strike. 
(b) Refusal of wages and working 
conditions less favorable than 
those existing in the immedi-
ate locality. 
(c) Refusing to join a company union or 
re sign from a bona fide labor union . 3 4 
At last Labor Secretary Perkins' dream had come true. Most 
state legislatures hedged on approval of the Act. State 
33peterson, American Labor Unions, p. 262. 
34"Eight States Rush to Pass Compensation Laws by New 
Year," Literary Digest, CXXII (December 26, 1939), pp. 7-8. 
19 
legislatures anticipated an invalidation of the law. The 
constitutionality of the Act was upheld in three cases on 
May 24, 1937. 35 
Further benefits were extended to labor in the Public 
Contracts Act (Walsh-Healy Act) of 1936. This Act stated 
that employees working on United States Government contracts 
amounting to $10 , 0 0 0 or more were to be paid the prevailing 
wage in the industry. Also, the Act prohibited child and 
convict labor. 36 Another piece of pro labor legislation passed 
in 1936 was the Byrnes Act (Anti-Strike Breaking Act). The 
Byrnes Act prohibited interstate transportation of anyone who 
is employed to obstruct peaceful picketing of employees or 
interfere with their right to organize and bargain collectively. 3 7 
The abundance of pro labor legislation was to reap divi-
dends for the Democratic Party in the 1936 elections. Labor 
contributed generously to the Democratic campaign chest. 
Labor's total contribution to the Democratic Party in 1936 was 
$ 7 7 0, 218 . When compared to the A. F. L. political contributions 
35"Social Security Act Declared Constitutional," Monthly 
Labor Review, XLV {July, 1937), pp. 179-187. 
3 6Harold W. Metz, Labor Policy of the Government 
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1945), p. 15. 
3 7 Peterson, American Labor Unions, p . 2 49 . 
20 
over the past thirty years which amounted to $95, OOO, labor' s 
contributions loom quite large . 3 8 A further breakdown of union 
contributions shows most of the money came from unions affiliated 
with the C. I. 0. Following is a list of union contributions: 
United Mine Workers of America 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers 
of America 
International Ladies Garment 
Workers Union 
Cap and Millinery Union 
International Alliance of 
Theatrical Stage Employees 
& Motion Picture Operators 
International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters 
Brewery Workers (Locals) 









Of the $469,870 the U .M.W. contributed, $50,000 of it was a 
loan to the Democratic National Committee. 39 
William Green personally supported Roosevelt. The A. F. L. 
did not endorse Roosevelt, although many of its affiliates did. 
Big business reduced its contribution to the Democratic Party 
from twenty-four per cent of the total campaign funds in 1932 to 
four per cent of the total campaign funds in 1936. 4o 
38Henry Pelling.t American Labor (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), p. 166. 
3 9Louise Overacker 1 "Labor' s Political Contributions, 11 
Political Science Quarterly, LIV (March, 1939), p. 59. 
40 Ibid., p. 60. 
21 
Governor Alfred Landon of Kansas, the 1936 Republican 
presidential nominee, earned labor 1 s wrath early in the campaign. 
A portion of Landon 1 s acceptance speech shows why labor 
denounced him: 
The right of labor to organize, means 
to me, the right of employees to join any 
type of union that they prefer, whether it 
covers their plant, their craft, or their 
industry. It means that / in the absence of 
a union contract, an employee has an equal 
right to join or refuse to join a union. 41 
In this speech Landon condoned the open shop and consequently 
lost union support. 
Union support for Roosevelt was evident in a speech by 
John L. Lewis. 
Labor has gained more under President 
Roosevelt than under any other President in 
memory. Obviously it is the duty of labor 
to support him one hundred per cent in the 
next election. 42 
In 1936 the Labor Non-Partisan League was established. The 
purpose of the League was to nominate and elect those candidates 
pledged to support labor. In the 1936 Presidential election the 
League contributed $170, OOO to re-elect Roosevelt. The League 
also supported the formation of the American Labor Party in New 
41Lewis / "Labor Bewitched," pp. 9-10. 
4 2 Dulles , Labor in America, p . 314 . 
22 
York. Sidney Hillman and John L. Lewis of the C .I. 0. were 
active leaders in the formation of the League. In fact, the 
C. I. 0. advanced the League $5 00 / OOO. Green and the A. F. L. 
accused the League of dualism in politics and would not support 
it. The Non-Partisan League was officially headed by George L. 
Berry of the Printing Pressman's Union. 
The Liberty League was Roosevelt 1 s most pitter and 
slanderous critic during the 1936 campaign. This group was 
composed of lawyers, financiers / and business leaders. The 
Liberty League charged Roosevelt with promoting foreign creeds 
of regimentation, socialism, and fascism. The Liberty League 
spent over $500,000 in the 1936 campaign in an attempt to de-
feat Roosevelt. This figure did not include funds collected and 
spent by the state and local units of the Liberty League. 43 
The American Labor Party, previously mentioned, was 
known formerly as the New York State Labor League. The 
American Labor Party nominated Roosevelt to gain the socialist 
vote in New York. The socialists believed Roosevelt was leading 
the class struggle against the economic royalists. 44 
43George Soule, "Liberty League Liberty, New Republic 
LXXXVIII (September 9, 193 6), pp. 121-122. 
44George E. Sokolsky, "The Split in Labor," Atlantic 
Monthly, CLVIII (October, 1936), p. 468. 
23 
With vengeance Roosevelt's critics attacked him in the 
1936 campaign. Projects such as F.E.R.A., T.V.A., and W.P.A. 
were viewed as vote acquiring schemes. The New Deal was 
promoting a decay of American "individualism" and creating a 
society of social parasites. In the last analysis Roosevelt's 
opponents contended, "You cannot beat Santa Claus." 45 
In all of Roosevelt's campaigns during the 1930's, the 
Republicans spent more than the Democrats. The figures below 
validate the above statement: 
1932 election 
19 3 6 election 
Democrats Republicans 
$2,245,975 $2,900,000 
5 I 1 9 4 I 7 41 8 /f 8 9 2 t 9 7 2 4 6 
It is interesting to note that labor contributed over a fifth of 
the Democrats total campaign funds in 1936. After the 1936 
election the Lonergan Committee, a Senate Investigating 
Committee, recommended the prohibition of contributions from 
labor. This recommendation made no headway at this time. 47 
45Louise Overacker / Presidential Campaign Funds 
(Boston: University Press, 1946), p. 18. 
46 Ibid. I p. 3 2. 
4 7 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 5 5. 
24 
The C .I.O. 'sties with President Roosevelt became strained 
after the 193 6 election. The primary reason for the tension was a 
feud between John L. Lewis and Roosevelt. Lewis' arrogance 
became unbearable after the 193 6 election. Lewis attributed the 
victory of the Democrats in 1936 to his vote producing ability. 
He also inferred the New Deal and Roosevelt were now fully 
obligated to C. I. 0. policies. Roosevelt very tactfully rebuked 
Lewis' thesis. As a result of the President's rebuke, Lewis 
began to nurse a grudge which would deepen in the ensuing dis-
pute with the "Little Steel" companies. 
In 19 3 7 the C . I. 0. made their first serious attempt to 
organize the steel workers. The drive to organize the steel 
workers was done through the Steel Workers Organizing Committee 
under the leadership of Philip Murray. The large steel companies 
such as United States Steel made an early agreement with S. W. 0. C. 
Organization of several smaller companies gave S. W. 0 .C. its 
biggest challenge. Republic Steel under the leadership of Tom 
Girdler, violently resisted unionization. Memorial Day, 193 7, saw 
ten strikers die at the Republic Steel Plant in South Chicago. The 
many exchanges between Lewis and Girdler so irritated Roosevelt 
that he lashed out at both of them saying "a plague upon both your 
houses. 1148 
48Dulles, Labor in America, p. 320. 
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As a result of this utterance, Lewis publicly denounced 
Roosevelt. In his classic statement Lewis claimed: 
It ill behooves one who has supped 
at labor's table and who has been 
sheltered in labor 1 s house, to curse with 
equal fervor and fine impartiality both 
labor and its adversaries when they 
become locked in deadly embrace. 49 
Lewis considered Roosevelt ungrateful for the support labor gave 
him in the 1936 campaign. Lewis returned to the Republican 
Party. Though Lewis left the Democratic Party most of the 
C . I. 0. , leaders and members remained loyal to the party. 
Roosevelt's attitude as exhibited in his utterance, "a plague 
upon both your houses," was actually beneficial to labor. 
After Roosevelt's outburst the government took a position of 
aloofness. The government refused to use force in stopping 
the many sit-down strikes. 5 0 
The sit-down strikes were utilized by the C. I. 0. in gaining 
recognition from General Motors, Chrysler, and Goodyear. Of 
the 4, 7 40 strikes in 193 7, 477 were sit-downs. The sit-down 
strikes were declared unconstitutional in March 1939. The sit-
downs were declared illegal in their inception and prosecution. 
The N. L .R. B. 1 s interpretation of the sit-down strikes was also 
49Ibid. I p. 321. 
50oexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt 
1932-45 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 65. 
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invalidated in this court decision. 51 
In 1937 Roosevelt became increasingly troubled over the 
split in labor. Grounds for Roosevelt's pessimism were evident on 
the West Coast. Harry Bridges of the C .I.O. and David Beck of 
the A. F. L. were bickering over jurisdictional rights in this area. 
President Roosevelt, who was touring the West Coast, found indica-
tions that the A. F. L. might break away from the New Deal. The 
major complaints of the A. F . L. were that the regional offices of the 
N .L.R.B. were biased and that the Wagner Act was operating for the 
benefit of the C. I. 0. Roosevelt's concern over the internecine war 
was justified politically. The A. F. L. and C. I. 0. were the New 
Deal' s principal supporters west of the Mississippi. 52 
Labor's biggest boost from the New Deal in 1938 was the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. The Act established minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours. It also provided for time and one-half rates for hours in 
excess of forty per week. Another notable provision of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act Prohibited child labor in concerns producing for 
interstate commerce. 53 
5l"Sit-Down Setback," Newsweek, XIII (March 6, 1939), 
pp. 47-48. 
52Richard L. Newberger, "Roosevelt Rides Again," Current 
History, XLVII (November, 1937), pp. 45-46. 
53paul H. Douglas and Joseph Hackman, "The Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938," Political Science Quarterly, LIV 
(March, 1939), p. 29. 
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The 1938 Congressional elections demonstrated labor 1s active 
position, however / labor 1s vote in 1938 lacked the solidarity it 
possessed in 1936. On the positive side for labor Senator Robert 
Wagner of New York was re-elected by a large majority. The 
American Labor Party polled over 400POO votes. A referendum 
against unionism was defeated in California. In New York, a 
11 bill of rights for labor 11 was written into the state constitution. 54 
One of labor 1s major defeats in the 1938 election was the defeat 
of Governor Frank Murphy in Michigan. Murphy had been 
instrumental in the success of the sit-down strikes at General 
Motors in 1937 when he refused to use the National Guard. 55 
The Non-Partisan League entered into the congressional elections 
of 19 3 8 and tried to defeat all opponents of the New Deal and to 
elect its adherents. 56 In the late 1930 1s Sidney Hillman of the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers assumed the political leadership 
of labor. Hillman's ties to the administration became strong as a 
result of the Lewis-Roosevelt split in 1937. 
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 turned the nation 
away from many of its domestic problems. The A.F .L. and the 
54 11 What Election Means t II New Republic t xcvrr (November 23 t 
1938), pp. 58-59. 
5511 Election Sets Stage for Purge of Administration's Purgers 1 11 
Newsweek, XII {November 21 1 1938), p. 11. 
5 6oulles, Labor In America , p. 315. 
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bulk of the C. I. 0. membership supported Roosevelt's foreign 
policy. Lewis bitterly resented Roosevelt's failure to use him as 
his principal adviser. As a result, Lewis took a hostile attitude 
to the President's foreign policy. Communist dominated unions 
opposed Roosevelt's foreign policy and promoted complete 
neutrality. The Communists' position coincided with the Nazi-
Soviet Pact signed in August, 1939. 57 
Labor's affiliation with politics carried into the 1940's. The 
Poli tic al Action Committee, under Hillman' s leadership, was organ -
ized in the early 1940's to support candidates sympathetic to labor. 
Labor' s relationship to politics was now an established precedent. 
Labor' s affiliation with politics was inevitable. The older 
political symbols had more prestige than those of the labor move-
ment. Consequently, labor had to move toward political action to 
achieve its goals. Though there were movements for a labor party 
in the 19 3 0 's , labor realized the tradition of the older parties 
carried weight that a new party would lack. Thus, the Democrats 
were a natural carrier of labor's objectives.SB 
5 7 Pelling, American Labor, pp. 171-17 2 . 
58Robert R. R. Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1937), p. 293. 
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It can hardly be doubted that Roosevelt and his advisers were 
not aware of labor' s plight and labor' s large bloc of votes. The 
workers and their potential political energy became more important 
to Roosevelt than the political immunity of the A.F.L. executive 
council. 59 
Because of labor' s political potential a large portion of the 
New Deal legislation was pro-labor. The New Deal stood for the 
right of wage earners to organize and bargain collectively. 
Because of the Wagner Act the government is obligated to pro-
tect labor' s rights. Social security and unemployment compensa-
tion gives relief and security to the unemployed. The New Deal 
means , above all, government intervention to remove economic 
maladjustments. New Deal legislation in the 1930's or depression 
decade made it possible for organized labor to realize some of its 
objectives. 60 
59Milton Derber and Edwin Young (ed.) / Labor and the New 
Deal; (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 181. 
6 OElmer A. Benson, "The Direction is Forward," Nation, 
CXLVII (December 3 1 1938}i p. 588. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Brooks, Robert R. R. When Labor Organizes. New Haven: Yale 
University Press" 193 7. 
Dulles / Foster Rhea. Labor In America. 2nd ed. revised. 
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1960. 
Freidel, Frank. America In The Twentieth Century. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc . , 19 6 0 • 
Harris, Herbert. American Labor. New Haven: Yale University 
Press , 19 3 8 . 
Hofstadter, Richard . The American Political Tradition. 
New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1959 
Labor and the New Deal. Edited by Milton Derber and Edwin 
Young. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 19 5 7 . 
Levinson, Edward. Labor On The March. New York: University 
Books 1 193 7. 
Metz , Harold W. Labor Policy of the Government. Washington, 
D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1945. 
Mitchell, Broadus. Depression Decade. New York: Rinehart & 
Company, Inc., 1947. 
Overacker, Louise. Presidential Campaign Funds. Boston: 
Boston University Press" 1946. 
Pelling, Henry. American Labor. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960. 
31 
Perkins, Dexter. The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt 1932-45. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. 
Peterson, Florence. American Labor Unions. New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1945. 
Schlesinger, Jr. , Arthur M. The Coming of the New Deal. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. 
The Crisis of the Old Order. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1957. 
Swisher, Carl Brent. Historic Decisions of the Supreme Court. 
Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958. 
Periodicals 
"A Conspiracy by Lawyers," Nation, CXLI, (October 2, 1935). 
369. 
Anderson, Paul K. "What the Election Means," Nation, CXLVII 
(November 19, 1938), 527-529. 
Beard, Charles A. "The Politics of Our Depression," Current 
History, XLI (October, 1934), 77-83. 
Benson, Elmer A. "The Direction Is Forward," Nation, CXLVII 
{December 3, 1938), 587-589. 
Douglas, Paul H., and Hackman, Joseph. "The Fair Standards 
Act of 193 8," Political Science Quarterly, LIV (March, 
1939) I 29-39 • 
"Eight States Rush to Pass Compensation Laws by New Year," 
Literary Digest, CXXII (December 26, 1936), 7-8. 
"Election Sets Stage for Purge of Administration's Purgers," 
Newsweek, XII (November 21, 1938), 11-14. 
"From Atlantic to Pacific," American Federationist, XLI 
(January, 1934), 88-91. 
32 
Frost, Stephen. "Lafollette' s Mixed Army," Outlook, CXXXCIII 
(October 29, 1924), 321-323. 
"Goodbye, Section 7a," New Republic, LXXX (October 31, 1934), 
325-326. 
Green, William. "Labor's Opportunity and Responsibility," 
American Federationist, XL (July, 1933), 692-694. 
Hallgren, Mauritz A. "Labor Under the New Deal," Current 
History, XLII (September, 19 3 5), 5 61-5 68. 
"Labor's Anti-Injunction Victory," Literary Digest, CXII 
(March26, 1932), 13. 
"Left vs. Right Battle-Lines Forming in Nation," Literary Digest, 
CXVIII (September 8, 19 3 4) , 6. 
Lewis, Cal. "Labor Bewitched, " The North American Review, 
CCXLII (Autumn, 193 6), 8-29. 
Lowry, Edward G. "La Follette's Own Platform," World's Work, 
XL VIII (September, 19 2 4), 513-518. 
Neuberger, Richard L. "Roosevelt Rides Again," Current History, 
XLVII (November, 1937), 42-47. 
"Organized Labor Spurns the Dole," Literary Digest, CXI 
(October 31, 1931), 10. 
Overacker, Louise, "Labor's Political Contributions," 
Political Science Quarterly, LIV (March, 1939), 56-58. 
Perkins, Frances. "Unemployment Insurance: An American Plan 
To Protect Workers and Avoid the Dole," The Survey, 
LXVII (November, 19 31), 117-119. 
"Sit-Down Setback," Newsweek, XIII (March 6, 1939), 47-48. 
"Social Security Act Declared Constitutional," Monthly 
Labor Review, XLV (July, 193 7), 179-18 7. 
Sokolsky, George E. "Labor' s Broken Front," Atlantic Monthly, 
CLIV (November, 1934), 627-637. 
33 
"The Split in Labor," Atlantic Monthly, CLVIII 
(October, 1936), 464-472. 
Soule / George. "Liberty League Liberty / " New Republic, 
LXXXVIII (September / 193 6), 121-125. 
"Unemployment Benefit Plans Now Operating in the United 
States," Congressional Digest, X (August, 1931}, 
208-223. 
Walling / William English. "tabor's Attitude Toward a Third 
Party t II Current History r XXI (October I 1924) t 32-40 
"What Election Means," New Republic, XCVII (November 23, 1938), 
57-59. 
"Where Election Leaves Labor," Literary Digest, LXXXIII 
(November 29, 1924}, 9-10. 
Wolman / Leo. "New National Labor Law," Review of Reviews, 
XCVII (September, 1935L 31-33. 
